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Quantum random number generators can provide genuine randomness by appealing to the fun-
damental principles of quantum mechanics. In general, a physical generator contains two parts—a
randomness source and its readout. The source is essential to the quality of the resulting random
numbers; hence, it needs to be carefully calibrated and modeled to achieve information-theoretical
provable randomness. However, in practice, the source is a complicated physical system, such as
a light source or an atomic ensemble, and any deviations in the real-life implementation from the
theoretical model may affect the randomness of the output. To close this gap, we propose a source-
independent scheme for quantum random number generation in which output randomness can be
certified, even when the source is uncharacterized and untrusted. In our randomness analysis, we
make no assumptions about the dimension of the source. For instance, multiphoton emissions are
allowed in optical implementations. Our analysis takes into account the finite-key effect with the
composable security definition. In the limit of large data size, the length of the input random seed is
exponentially small compared to that of the output random bit. In addition, by modifying a quan-
tum key distribution system, we experimentally demonstrate our scheme and achieve a randomness
generation rate of over 5× 103 bit/s.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers play important roles in many fields,
such as scientific simulation [1], cryptography [2], testing
fundamental principles of physics [3], and lotteries. Dif-
ferent applications require different levels of randomness.
In cryptography, input randomness is one of the security
foundations in communication protocols. In fact, many
commercial products for generating random numbers ex-
ist in the market; such products function under various
information-theoretical or computational assumptions.
In computer science, random number generators
(RNGs) are based on generating pseudorandom num-
bers [4] in which a random seed is expanded according
to some deterministic procedure. By definition, these
RNGs produce sequences that are not truly random. Al-
though these sequences usually attain a perfect balance
between 0s and 1s, strong long-range correlations exist
which undermine cryptographic security and may cause
unexpected errors in scientific simulations.
In contrast, hardware RNGs originating from physi-
cal processes, such as noise in electric devices, nuclear
fission, and circuit and radial decay [5–11], are believed
to be able to offer better random numbers. However, it
is unclear whether they are truly random because these
RNGs normally involve complicated classical physics pro-
cesses that produce no randomness.
To solve this problem, the new field of quantum ran-
dom number generators (QRNGs) has emerged. These
generators stem from the uncertainty principle in quan-
tum mechanics and are therefore inherently random. Ex-
isting QRNG methods include single photon detection
[12–15], vacuum state fluctuations [16], and quantum
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phase fluctuations [17]. These approaches have developed
to the point that some commercial QRNG products are
available [15, 18–21].
A typical QRNG can be decomposed into two modules:
a randomness source (quantum state preparation) and its
readout (measurement), as shown in Fig. 1. In general,
the source emits quantum states that are superpositions
of the measurement basis. The output (raw) random
numbers are the measurement results. In many QRNGs,
a short random seed is required to assist state preparation
or measurement.
FIG. 1. Illustration of a generic QRNG setup in which we
take photon polarization as the example. H and V refer to
horizontal and vertical polarizations, respectively. PBS refers
to a polarizing beam splitter. (a) The source functions nor-
mally (or trusted) and sends superpositions of H and V polar-
izations, which offers quantum randomness. (b) The source
malfunctions (or untrusted) and sends H and V polarizations
in a predetermined order, which should output no genuine
randomness. From the measurement result viewpoint, one
cannot distinguish these two cases.
As an example, consider a simple QRNG that projects
the quantum state |+〉 = (|H〉 + |V 〉)/√2 emitted from
2a single photon source on the horizontal and vertical po-
larization basis |H〉, |V 〉. This QRNG can be divided
into two modules, as shown in Fig. 1(a). Randomness
is guaranteed by the intrinsically probabilistic nature of
quantum physics. Hereafter, we denote |H〉, |V 〉 (|+〉,
|−〉) as the Z-basis (X-basis) eigenstates.
Existing practical QRNGs suffer from security loop-
holes if the devices are not perfect. In the source readout
model, the measurement device can normally be trusted
due to its simple structure. For instance, in the pre-
vious example, the measurement is a simple demolition
measurement on the polarization basis. In contrast, the
randomness contained in a source, such as a laser or
an atomic ensemble, is normally difficult to characterize
completely. If the source malfunctions and emits classical
signals instead of quantum ones, the outputs may not be
truly random. Consider the worst-case scenario in which
the devices are designed or controlled by an adversary
Eve. Eve can employ a pseudo-RNG to output a fixed
(from Eve’s viewpoint) string that still appears random
to Alice. More concretely, in the example of the previous
paragraph, when a dishonest source emits Z-basis instead
of X-basis eigenstates for the Z-basis measurement, the
output will just be a fixed string, as shown in Fig. 1(b).
From this perspective, with given measurement devices,
justifying the randomness in a source is crucial to gener-
ating randomness.
Most existing QRNGs use complicated physical mod-
els [17, 22] to quantify their sources. For example, the
dimension of the source is sometimes assumed to be a
fixed known number [23]. The underlying models implic-
itly assume the existence of randomness in the first place,
but this assumption cannot be verified experimentally.
Therefore, to achieve truly reliable randomness, there is
a strong motivation to avoid the use of such models. Note
that removing the dimension assumption is the key chal-
lenge to the analysis for device-independent scenarios.
Thus, a QRNG without trusting the source (source-
independent) is both theoretically and practically mean-
ingful and greatly needed. A device-independent QRNG
[24] can generate randomness without having to trust the
devices. This type of QRNG requires a short seed for de-
vice testing, which is the reason why they are also called
randomness expansions [25–27]. By observing the viola-
tion of a certain Bell’s inequality, such as the Clauser-
Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality [28], one can guarantee
the presence of randomness without any assumptions
about the source or the measurement device. The main
drawback of device-independent QRNGs is that they are
not loss tolerant, which typically imposes very severe re-
quirements on experimental devices. Furthermore, this
type of QRNG generates random numbers at rates that
are very low for practical applications. The highest speed
of this type of QRNG has, so far, been reported to be
0.4 bps [29].
Here, we propose a source-independent QRNG
(SIQRNG) scheme that is loss tolerant and hence highly
practical. In particular, our scheme allows the source
to have arbitrary and unknown dimensions. The loss-
tolerance property enables potential high-loss implemen-
tations of our scheme, such as in integrated optic chips
or with inefficient but cheap single photon detectors. We
analyze the randomness of the scheme based on comple-
mentary uncertainty relations. Our analysis takes into
account several practical issues, including finite-key-size
effects, multiphoton components in the source, initial
seed length, and losses. The analysis combines several
ingredients from the security proof of quantum key distri-
bution (QKD), a rich subject that has developed over the
last two decades. These ingredients include phase error
correction [30], random sampling [31], and the squashing
model [32]. Since the squashing model shows the equiv-
alence between threshold detectors and qubit detectors
[32], our scheme allows the source to have an unfixed fi-
nite dimension as well as an infinite dimension. For sim-
plicity, in the rest of the paper, we assume a two-level
(bit) output system. All our techniques can be directly
applied to cases with more outputs.
In many theoretical aspects, there are strong similari-
ties between QKD and QRNG. For example, the security
definition in QKD can be applied to the definition of ran-
domness in QRNG, and similar proof techniques can be
applied to both, as we do in the later analysis. However,
in some practical scenarios, there are subtle differences
between the two. For example, local randomness is free
in QKD but not in QRNG. A more crucial difference
lies in the trustworthy components of QKD and QRNG
in practice. In QKD, the sender and receiver are two
remotely separated parties, so an adversary could inter-
cept and resend the transmitted signals in the quantum
channel and then take advantage of the imperfections of
measurement devices to perform attacks. Thus, com-
pared to the source, the measurement device becomes a
more vulnerable part of a QKD system.
Different from QKD, source and measurement devices
in QRNG are normally local, so attacks aimed at imper-
fections in measurement devices seem more artificial than
practical. The main purpose in studying the untrusted
device scenario in QRNG is to address device imperfec-
tions. This subtle difference may lead to deviations be-
tween QKD and QRNG. For instance, it is reasonable
to assume that Alice can characterize the measurement
device for QRNG well and trust it during random num-
ber production. Furthermore, compared to QKD, the
source in QRNG involves a complicated design so that
the QRNG is fast and convenient. For instance, in a re-
cent experiment [33], a QRNG was demonstrated based
on measuring light-emitting diode (LED) light with a
mobile phone. Such sources are hard to characterize and
could possibly be manipulated by Eve, but one can rea-
sonably trust one’s own mobile phone. From this view-
point, the source in QRNG is at least as problematic as
the measurement. Thus in our work, we take the rea-
sonable assumption that the measurement device can be
characterized well but not the source. Note that the op-
posite scenario, where the source rather than the mea-
3surement device of QRNG is trusted, has also been re-
cently investigated [34].
To show the practicality of the proposed scheme, we
provide a proof-of-principle experimental demonstration
by simply modifying a QKD system. We experimen-
tally examine the effect of different detector efficiencies
on the randomness generation rate. Under a practical
total transmittance, a high randomness generation rate
can be achieved.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present our protocol. In Section III, we an-
alyze the protocol and calculate the min-entropy of its
output after investigating various practical scenarios. In
Section IV, an experimental demonstration of our proto-
col is performed. Finally, we conclude in Section V.
II. PROTOCOL
A schematic of our SIQRNG protocol is shown in
Fig. 2(a). Here, we take an optical implementation as
the example, as shown in Fig. 2(b). All our results ap-
ply similarly to other implementation systems. Quantum
signals from the source first go through a modulator that
actively chooses between the X and Z bases. Then, a
polarizing beam splitter and two threshold detectors per-
form a projective measurement. Since two detectors are
used, there are four possible outcomes: no clicks (losses),
two single clicks, and double clicks. This implementa-
tion is equivalent to the schematic setup of the squashing
model as discussed in Section III A. The details of the
protocol are presented in Fig. I.
FIG. 2. (a) Measurement model for SIQRNG. The quantum
state first passes through a squasher and is projected as either
a qubit or a vacuum. Then, the output qubit is measured in
the X or Z basis chosen by an active switch. There are two
outcomes for each basis measurement, corresponding to the
two eigenstates of the basis. (b) An optical implementation of
the SIQRNG in (a), as discussed in Section IIIA. Here Pol-M
refers to a polarization modulator, PBS refers to a polarizing
beam splitter, and D0 and D1 are the threshold detectors.
1. Source: An untrusted party, Eve, prepares many
quantum states in an arbitrary and unknown di-
mension and feeds them into the measurement box
of Alice.
2. Squashing: Alice (or Eve) squashes the quantum
states into qubits and vacua. Alice postselects the
vacua and obtains n squashed qubits. The vacuum
components take into account optical losses and
quantum efficiencies.
3. Random sampling: By consuming a short seed
with the length given in Eq. (6), Alice randomly
chooses nx out of the n squashed qubits and mea-
sures them in the X basis, each results in |+〉 or
|−〉.
4. Parameter estimation: When the system oper-
ates properly, the source emits qubits |+〉 for all
runs. Thus, a result of |−〉 in the X-basis mea-
surement is defined as an error. A double click is
considered to be half an error. Alice evaluates the
bit error rate ebx in the X basis and its statistical
deviation θ according to Eq. (5). If ebx + θ ≥ 1/2,
Alice aborts the protocol.
5. Randomness generation: For the remaining n−
nx squashed qubits, Alice performs measurement
in the Z basis to generate nz = n − nx random
bits.
6. Randomness extraction: Alice picks a param-
eter te according to the desired failure probability
restriction and extracts nz−nzH(ebx+θ)− te bits
of final randomness using Toeplitz-matrix hashing
[35, 36]a.
7. Security parameter: With the compos-
able security definition, the security parameter
(in trace-distance measure) is given by ε =√
(εθ + 2−te)(2− εθ − 2−te).
a Other extraction methods, such as Trevisan’s extractor
[37] can be applied, in which the relation between the
failure probability and te can differ.
TABLE I. Source-independent QRNGwith the finite data size
effect. The results are proven in Section III.
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the randomness output of
the SIQRNG protocol. Strictly speaking, like device-
independent QRNGs, our scheme is a randomness ex-
pansion scheme, in which a random seed is used to gen-
erate extra independent randomness. The procedure of
parameter estimation is an analog to the phase error
rate estimation in QKD postprocessing [36]. Random-
ness extraction is mathematically equivalent to privacy
amplification in QKD. The difference between the biased
measurement used here and the biased-basis choice QKD
protocol [38] is that the number ofX-basis measurements
4is a constant in our case, whereas in QKD, this number
must go to infinity when the data size is infinitely large.
A. Squashing model
In the SIQRNG scheme, we assume that measurement
devices are trusted and well characterized. The key as-
sumption here is that the measurement setup is compat-
ible with the squashing model. In other words, a mea-
surement can be treated in two steps. First, the (un-
known arbitrary-dimensional) signal state emitted from
the source is projected to a qubit or vacuum. The pro-
jection is called a squasher, as shown in Fig. 2(a). Then,
the squashed qubits are postselected by discarding the
vacua and measuring them in the X or Z basis. This
assumption can be satisfied when threshold detectors are
used with random bit assignments for double clicks [32].
For the protocol described in Section II, the X-basis mea-
surement results are used for parameter estimation and
are then discarded in postprocessing. Thus, the random
assignment can be replaced by adding half of the double-
click ratio to the X-basis error rate.
In practice, it is a challenge to verify whether a mea-
surement setup is compatible with the squashing model.
Much effort has been put into this question [39]. The key
point here is to make the two detectors respond equally
to (four) different qubits, and hence make the measure-
ment device basis independent [40]. This can be done by
adding a series of filters (including spectrum and tem-
poral filters) before the threshold detectors, to ensure
that the input states stay within a proper set of opti-
cal modes [41], in which the detectors have the same
efficiencies [32, 40]. One can further assume that Al-
ice uses a trusted source to calibrate the measurement
devices beforehand; that is, Alice performs a quantum
measurement tomography. A similar measurement cali-
bration procedure should be done in most current QKD
and QRNG realizations. Here, we emphasize that the
verification of the squashing model does not affect the
source-independent property of our scheme. Thus, we
leave detailed investigation on validating the measure-
ment setting for future works.
Similar to the QKD case [32], we can assume that
the squashing operator is held by Eve in the random-
ness analysis. By this, we mean that Eve can choose
a valid operator, so long as the output is a qubit or a
vacuum. In the following discussions, we focus on the
squashed qubits. We need to determine the min-entropy
associated with these qubits in the Z-basis measurement.
B. Complementary uncertainty relation
First, we show intuitively why the protocol works. Ac-
cording to quantum mechanics, the outcome of project-
ing the state |+〉 on the Z basis is random. Of course,
in reality, due to device imperfections, Alice would never
obtain a perfect state of |+〉. Now, the key question
for Alice becomes how to verify that the source faith-
fully emits the state |+〉. This can be done by borrowing
a similar technique from the security analysis of QKD
[30, 42, 43] and consider an equivalent virtual protocol
depicted in Fig. II, where we replace steps 5 and 6 by 5′
and 6′. In steps 3 and 4 of the protocol, Alice occasion-
ally performs the X-basis measurement and defines the
phase error rate to be the ratio of detecting |−〉. In the
virtual protocol, once Alice knows the phase error rate
by random sampling tests, she can perform a phase error
correction (step 5′) before the final Z-basis measurement
(step 6′). From the smart design of the phase error cor-
rection procedure [30], Alice can make it commute with
the Z-basis measurement. Thus, she can perform the Z-
basis measurement (step 5) first and then apply random-
ness extraction (step 6). At this stage, all the states have
already collapsed to classical results, and the phase error
correction procedure becomes randomness extraction (or
privacy amplification in QKD) [30, 42, 43]. Besides QKD,
the argument here is similar to the one used in Ref. [44],
where one can consider the error correction process 5′ as
distilling coherence or randomness extraction.
5’ Error correction: Based on phase error rate ebx,
Alice performs phase error correction and obtains
nz[1−H(ebx)] copies of perfect |+〉 with a nearly unit
probability.
6’ Randomness generation: After obtaining all states
in |+〉, Alice performs measurement in the Z basis to
get nz[1−H(ebx)] random bits.
TABLE II. An equivalent protocol of source-independent
QRNG.
It has been proved that the phase error correction
(randomness extraction) can be efficiently done with
Toeplitz-matrix hashing [35]. Suppose the number of
qubits measured in the Z basis is nz and the phase er-
ror rate is epz, the number of bits sacrificed in the phase
error correction is given by
nzH(epz) + te, (1)
and the probability that the phase error correction fails
is 2−te [36]. Here, H(e) = −e log e− (1 − e) log(1− e) is
the binary Shannon entropy function, all the log is base
2 throughout the paper, and te is the parameter Alice
picks up by balancing the failure probability and the final
output length. Then, the number of final random bits is
given by,
K ≥ nz − nzH(epz)− te. (2)
In practice, Alice needs to prepare a Toeplitz matrix of
size nz× [nz−nzH(epz)− te] for randomness extraction.
5We note that the failure probability 2−te quantifies fi-
delity between the state that results from the phase error
correction and the ideal state |+〉⊗nz . In the composable
security definition [45, 46], a trace-distance measure se-
curity parameter εt should be employed. Its relation to
the fidelity measure εf is given by [31]
εt =
√
εf (2− εf ) (3)
In the following, we use the fidelity measure for the fail-
ure probability, which, in the end, can be conveniently
converted to the trace-distance measure security param-
eter.
To construct the Toeplitz matrix of size nz × [nz −
nzH(epz)− te], Alice needs to use nz + nz − nzH(epz)−
te− 1 random bits. Thanks to the Leftover Hash Lemma
[47], the Toeplitz hashing extractor can be proven to be
a strong extractor. That is, the output random bits are
independent of the random bits used in the construction
of the Toeplitz matrix [48]. Thus, the Toeplitz matrix
can be reused.
Our result can also be derived via a different but ele-
gant approach by employing a newly developed seminal
uncertainty relation [49] and extending the Leftover Hash
Lemma [47] to the quantum scenario [50]. Interestingly,
the result from that approach yields a security param-
eter (in trace-distance measure) that is of the order of
2−te/2, which is consistent with ours. Such techniques
have been successfully applied in some applications, in-
cluding QRNGs [23].
C. Finite key analysis
In practice, the QRNG only runs for a finite time; con-
sequently, the sampling tests for the X-basis measure-
ments will suffer from statistical fluctuations. In the pa-
rameter estimation step, the key parameter epz in Eq. (2)
should be estimated (bounded) from the finite data size
effect.
In the random sampling test, Alice measures the
squashed qubits in the X basis and obtains the error
rate, ebx. Remember that, as required in the squashing
model, this error rate includes half of the double-click ra-
tio. Henceforth, we simply call this error rate theX-basis
error rate. Recall that the phase error rate epz is defined
as the error rate if the quantum signals measured in the
Z basis are measured in the X basis. When the sampling
size is large enough, epz can be well approximated by ebx.
Before presenting the details of the random sampling
analysis, we establish a notation. Suppose Alice receives
n squashed qubits and randomly chooses nx of them to
be measured in the X basis, leaving the remaining nz =
n − nx qubits in the Z basis. Let the ratio of X-basis
measurements be qx = nx/n, the number of errors Alice
finds in the X basis be k, and the total number of errors
be m if Alice measures all qubits in the X basis. Then,
the number of errors in the qubits measured in the Z
basis is m − k, which is the key parameter we need to
determine through random sampling. The quantity m−
k = nzepz determines the randomness extraction rate.
Define the lower bound of epz by,
epz ≤ ebx + θ, (4)
where θ is the deviation due to statistical fluctuations.
Following the random sampling results of Fung et al. [31],
we can bound the probability when Eq. (4) fails,
εθ = Prob(epz > ebx + θ)
≤ 1√
qx(1− qx)ebx(1− ebx)n
2−nξ(θ),
(5)
where ξ(θ) = H(ebx+θ−qxθ)−qxH(ebx)−(1−qx)H(ebx+
θ). Note that in the unlikely event that ebx = 0, the
failure probability is unbounded, and one should rederive
the failure probability or simply replace ebx with a small
value, say, 1/nx.
In practice, the failure probability εθ is normally picked
to be a small number depending on applications. In later
data postprocessing, we pick up εθ = 2
−100. Once εθ is
fixed, there is a trade-off between qx and θ for the ra-
tio of the final random bit length over the raw data size.
Thus, the number of samples for the X-basis measure-
ment should be optimized for the randomness extraction
rate.
One key property for the random sampling is that the
nx locations of the X-basis measurements are randomly
chosen from the total n locations, i.e., the
(
n
nx
)
cases are
equally likely to occur. Then, Alice needs a random seed
with a length of
nseed = log
(
n
nx
)
≤ nx logn. (6)
The effect of loss on the seed length will be discussed in
Section IIID. In Appendix A, we show that nx can re-
main a constant, given the failure probability, when n is
large. Then, in the large data size limit, the seed length is
exponentially small compared to the length of the output
random bit. Therefore, we reach an exponential random-
ness expansion.
D. Practical issues
Multiphotons: In our protocol, the source is allowed
to emit multiphotons, since its dimension is assumed to
be uncharacterized. In other words, these components do
not affect the randomness of the final output. In practice,
multiphotons may introduce double clicks when thresh-
old detectors are used [32]; these double clicks will di-
rectly contribute to the error rate term ebx. Thus, when
the multi-photon ratio is very high, the double-click ratio
will increase to a point at which the upper bound on in-
formation leakage epz increases to one-half; at that point,
6no random bits can be extracted according to Eq. (2) and
Alice simply aborts the protocol.
Loss: The loss tolerance of our protocol is guaranteed
by the squashing model in which the measurement is as-
sumed to be basis independent [32]. This assumption can
be guaranteed by the fact that the basis is chosen after
losses. Alice does not anticipate the positions of losses, so
she effectively decides the (random) positions for X-basis
measurements before losses. The effect of loss only de-
creases the number of effective X measurements, but the
positions of effective X measurements are still uniformly
random in squashed qubits; this fulfills the requirement
of random sampling. The detailed proof is shown in Ap-
pendix B.
Basis-dependent detector efficiency: Our proto-
col assumes that the efficiencies of the detectors are the
same. In practice, efficiency mismatches would cause the
measurement to be different for the two bases (basis de-
pendent). A viable way to deal with this imperfection is
to recalculate the rate as a function of the ratio between
the efficiencies of the two bases, employing the technique
used in QKD [40]. As indicated by the result in QKD [40],
the random number generation rate will slightly decrease
when there is a small mismatch in detector efficiencies.
More precisely, we denote the ratio between the minimum
and maximum efficiencies of the two detectors as r ≤ 1,
then the key size becomes rnz(1 − H [(ebx + θ)/r]) − te
bits. We leave detailed analysis of this imperfection for
future work.
Double clicks: Our analysis takes account of the ef-
fect of double clicks by adding half of the double-click ra-
tio to the X-basis error rate, as required in the squashing
model. This is also essentially why multiphoton states
can be used on the source side without affecting final
randomness. Note that double clicks should not be dis-
carded freely in the measurement. Otherwise, a security
loophole will appear, namely, a strong pulse attack [51].
In a strong pulse attack, Eve always sends strong sig-
nals (with many photons) in the Z basis. Suppose she
sends a strong state in |H〉; if Alice chooses the Z-basis
measurement, a valid raw random bit will be obtained,
but if she chooses the X basis, a double click is likely to
happen. In our protocol, when Alice chooses the X-basis
measurement, she should get an error (resulting in |−〉)
with a probability of one-half. If Alice simply discards all
double clicks, Eve’s attack will not be noticed. This at-
tack cannot be explained by a qubit measurement. This
is intuitively why the squashing model requires random
assignments for double clicks.
Basis choice: When choosing X- or Z-basis measure-
ments, an input random string of length N (as a seed) is
needed. Suppose the number of X-basis measurements
to be performed is Nx, then Alice chooses Nx positions
out of N with equal probability, i.e., with probability(
N
Nx
)−1
. Then, she needs a seed length of log
(
N
Nx
)
. This
is similar to Eq. (6) with the difference that before the
measurement, Alice does not know the positions of losses.
More details on how to dilute a short random seed to a
longer (partially random) one are provided in Appendix
C.
Intensity optimization: The intensity of the source
should be optimized to maximize the randomness gener-
ation rate. With increasing intensity, the detection rate
will increase along with an increases in the double-click
rate (and hence epz increases). There exists a trade-off
between nz and epz, as shown in Eq. (2).
IV. EXPERIMENT DEMONSTRATION
In this section, we perform a proof-of-principle exper-
imental demonstration to show the practicality of the
SIQRNG scheme. Our experiment setup consists of two
parts, the source, owned by an untrusted party Eve, and
the measurement device, owned by the user Alice. The
schematic diagram is shown in Fig. 3.
BS1
BS2
BS3PBS2
PBS1
BS4
PD
FPC1
FPC2
FPC3
S
FA
TD1
TD2
TD4
TD3
Eve Alice
LP
FIG. 3. Experiment setup of SIQRNG. S: laser source; LP:
linear polarizer; FPC: fiber polarization controller; FA: fiber
attenuator; BS: beam splitter; PBS: polarizing beam splitter;
TD: time delay implemented with a 12 m fiber; PD: photon
detector.
On Eve’s side, a laser, labeled as S, with a wavelength
of 850 nm and a repetition rate of 1 MHz is used as a
photon source. The power of the laser is adjusted to be
one photon per pulse. Instead of assuming each state
is a qubit system, each pulse that the laser sends is a
coherent state of infinite dimensions. The pulse of the
laser is then modulated to |+〉 polarization by a linear
polarizer (LP) and a fiber polarization controller (FPC1).
Between the source and the measurement device, we put
a fiber attenuator (FA) to simulate different losses in the
system.
On Alice’s side, first a series of filters needs to be ap-
plied to ensure the measured optical mode is pure be-
fore entering the threshold detectors, as required by the
squashing model. For demonstration purposes, we use
7a single-mode fiber to play the role of a filter. Ideally,
frequency and temporal filters should also be added to
further purify the optical mode in order to make the
photons indistinguishable. For demonstration purposes,
a biased beam splitter (BS1) with a ratio of 1 : 49 is
used to passively choose the X or Z basis. Finally, Alice
records when the photon detector (PD) clicks. The de-
tector is time-division-multiplexed by adding four time
delays TD1–TD4 (60 ns each) in the optical paths, so
that it can simulate four detectors that detect the out-
comes of both bases and each bit value. The gate width
and the dead time of the detector are 10 ns and 50 ns,
respectively.
The phase error rate, as calculated in Eq. (4), is plotted
in Fig. 4. The typical values of the related experimental
parameters are listed as follows. The raw key size is
N = 106; the dark count is 0.002; the detector efficiency
(without a FC adaptor) is 45%; the misalignment error
of the source is 2%; and the failure probability is εθ =
2−100. The figure shows that the error rate increases
as the loss becomes large. This is because the effect of
dark counts becomes dominant when the loss is high.
Because of statistical fluctuations, the phase error rate
increases when the data size shrinks. Note, in particular,
that the phase error rate can go beyond 20% under high
losses, which does not yield any key rates in most QKD
protocols. Nevertheless, random numbers can still be
generated in our SIQRNG scheme.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
0
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FIG. 4. Relation between the phase error rate and the loss.
The big error bars are caused by a very conservative esti-
mation of statistical fluctuations and also partially by the
fluctuation of experimental parameters for different losses.
The relation between the randomness generation rate
and the loss is plotted in Fig. 5. It can be seen that
the randomness generation rate becomes lower with a
larger loss, which is consistent with Fig. 4. Under prac-
tical detector efficiency, the randomness generation rate
still achieves a relatively high rate of 5× 103 bit/s. Note
that, the intensity of the source is fixed in our experimen-
tal demonstration. In practice, the intensity of the source
can be increased to compensate the loss, and actually the
maximum randomness generation rate in our scheme is
mainly limited by the dead time of the detector. For our
detector with a dead time of 50 ns, the maximum ran-
domness generation rate is 1 bit/50 ns=20 Mbps, which
requires the source to be a single photon source with a
repetition rate of 20 Mbps. For practical implementa-
tions with coherent-state sources, the randomness gener-
ation rate can reach the order of 2 Mbps after taking into
account various errors and finite data size effects.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
103
104
Loss (dB)
R
an
do
m
ne
ss
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
ra
te
 (b
its
/se
c)
FIG. 5. Dependency of randomness generation rate on the
loss. The data points on the figure are taken to be the lower
bound of the rate, evaluated by random sampling. The secu-
rity parameter is εt = 2× 2
−50
After obtaining the random bits, we apply the
Toeplitz-matrix hashing [35] on the raw data to obtain
final random numbers. To test the randomness, we fur-
ther perform two statistical tests on the output of our
SIQRNG, the autocorrelation test and the NIST test
suite [52]. The autocorrelation is defined as
R(j) =
E[(Xi − µ)(Xi+j − µ)]
σ2
, (7)
where j is the lag between the samples, Xi is the i-th
sample bit, µ and σ are the average and the variance
of the sample, and E stands for expectation. The result
of the autocorrelation test of raw data and final data is
shown in Fig. 6. It can be seen that the autocorrelation
is substantially reduced in the final data. The result of
NIST tests on the final data is shown in Fig. 7. We can
see that all tests are passed.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a source-independent and loss-
tolerant QRNG scheme and its experimental demonstra-
tion in a passive basis choice realization. From an exper-
imental point of view, the beam splitter itself, as part
of the measurement device, may also be uncharacter-
ized. Thus, it would also be interesting to demonstrate
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FIG. 6. The autocorrelation function of the raw data and the
final data. The x axis is the lag j between the sampled dataXi
and Xi+j , while the y axis is the autocorrelation R(j) defined
in Eq. (7). Data sizes of both the raw data and the final data
are on the order of 107. The autocorrelation of the final data
is significantly smaller than the raw data in absolute value.
Because of finite-key-size effects, the autocorrelation cannot
be zero even for perfectly random strings.
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FIG. 7. The P value of the statistical tests. The x axis lists
the names of statistical tests in the NIST test suite. The final
data size is 91 Mbit, which is extracted from 115-Mbit raw
data. To pass each test, the P value should be at least 0.01
and the proportion of sequences that satisfy P > 0.01 should
be at least 96%. It can be seen in the figure that the P values
of all tests are greater than 0.01.
our scheme with an active basis choice in the future. In
fact, when the source operates properly, the speed of our
protocol is comparable to that of a trusted polarization-
based QRNG whose frequency is limited only by single
photon detectors—approximately 100 Mbps [53].
Some current realizations of QRNG experiments could
be converted to our SIQRNG protocol. For example, a
LED could be used as the source, as regular QRNG [33].
Since the polarizations of a LED are random, it would
be convenient to add a polarizer for the |+〉 direction to
make the source-polarized light. Since the detector can
work in a gated mode, it does not matter whether the
light source is continuous or pulsed. This shows why the
repetition rate is limited only by single-photon detectors.
Viewed from another angle, such a setup could also be
used to test quantum features of macroscopic sources.
For future projects, it would be interesting to investi-
gate other loss-tolerant self-testing QRNG schemes. Es-
sentially, we are aiming to design a QRNG to tolerate
large losses and generate fast random numbers simulta-
neously, given the minimum assumptions of a practical
setup.
Added note: Upon completion of this work, we no-
ticed a related work [23], the uncertainty relation is em-
ployed to quantify entropy in QRNG and finite-key ef-
fects are taken into consideration with smooth min en-
tropies. The work also aimed at provable randomness
with untrusted sources. However, it makes a strong as-
sumption on the dimension of the source, which turns
out to be the key barrier for source-independent QRNG.
Moreover, the practical imperfections, such as multi-
photons, device imperfections and losses, are not con-
sidered. Our work, on the other hand, use the squashing
model for arbitrary dimension system and take account
of imperfections in practical scenarios.
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Appendix A: Calculation of the number of effective
X-basis measurements
In this appendix, we show that in the asymptotic limit,
the number of effectiveX-basis measurements is indepen-
dent of n. Our starting point is Eq. (5) and εθ < 2
−100.
Notice that normally n is smaller than 1012 < 240 to ease
fast postprocessing; thus, the term 1/
√
n and the other
polynomial terms in Eq. (5) play a relatively small role
in making εθ < 2
−100. In the following, we consider only
the exponent in Eq. (5).
For ease of notation, let x = ebx, y = ebx + θ and
q = qx. Then the exponent of Eq. (5) becomes
n[H((1− q)y + qx)− qH(x) − (1− q)H(y)]
and the inequality εθ < 2
−100 is approximately equiva-
9lent to
n[q(H((1 − q)y + qx)−H(x))+
(1− q)(H((1 − q)y + qx)−H(y))] ≥ 100. (A1)
Since q is very small, one can make three approximations:
H((1− q)y + qx) −H(y) ≈ −H ′(y)q(y − x), (A2)
q[H((1− q)y + qx)−H(x)] ≈ q(H(y)−H(x)) (A3)
and
q2 ≈ 0. (A4)
Then, by applying Eqs. (A2) and (A3), the inequality
(A1) becomes
n[q(H(y)−H(x))− (1− q)(H ′(y)q(y−x))] & 100. (A5)
Applying Eq. (A4) yields
n[q(H(y)−H(x))−H ′(y)q(y − x)] & 100, (A6)
and rearranging terms, we have
q &
100
n[H(y)−H(x)−H ′(y)(y − x)] . (A7)
Substituting the definitions of x and y, we obtain
q &
100
n[H(ebx + θ)−H(ebx)−H ′(ebx + θ)θ] . (A8)
Finally, we substitute q = nx/n and get
nx ≈ 100
H(ebx + θ)−H(ebx)−H ′(ebx + θ)θ , (A9)
which is independent of n.
Appendix B: Proof of the random sampling
property for a type of QRNG input after loss
In this appendix, we first restate the setting. In the
idealistic protocol, the measurement device chooses its
measurement basis after confirming that the state re-
ceived from the source is not a vacuum (or equivalently,
not lost). In practice, confirming whether a state is a
vacuum is usually done by observing whether detectors
in the measurement device click or not. Thus, it is desir-
able for the measurement device to choose its basis before
confirming whether loss happens.
We prove that for a specific input that defines the mea-
surement basis choices before the potential loss, the posi-
tions of nx valid X-basis measurements (after excluding
loss events) are randomly drawn from the positions of
the total of n valid measurements. This proves that the
random sampling technique from Fung et al. can still be
applied when the measurement basis is chosen before the
loss.
For ease of presentation, we state the input that spec-
ifies the measurement choices before the loss as follows.
The input is a string of length N = Nx + Nz that con-
tainsNx 0s andNz 1s. The
(
N
Nz
)
possibilities for choosing
the positions of Nz 1s from the total Nx +Nz positions
are equally likely. Here, 0 stands for an X-basis measure-
ment and 1 stands for a Z-basis measurement. After loss,
the numbers of valid X-basis measurements and Z-basis
measurements are denoted by nx and nz, respectively,
with a total string length of
n = nx + nz. (B1)
We need to show that the output is uniform for the(
nx+nz
nz
)
possibilities of choosing the positions of nz 1s
from the total n positions.
The proof proceeds through a symmetry argument.
The input is symmetric, i.e., if we exchange the indices of
two positions, the distribution will not change. Suppose
that the initial positions are 1, 2, . . . , n and the probabil-
ity of choosing specific positions for Nz 1s from the total
N positions is
p =
1(
Nx+Nz
Nz
) . (B2)
For ease of presentation, denote the left positions after
loss as i1 < i2 < · · · < in. Then each possibility with nx
0s in the left n positions has the same probability
p1 = p×
(
N − n
Nx − nx
)
, (B3)
which proves our claim.
As a side remark, we see that the proof does not de-
pend on whether the loss is basis dependent or indepen-
dent. Thus, the same property also holds for a more gen-
eral class of losses that could be useful in other settings.
Another remark is that independent and identically dis-
tributed input also satisfies the property, as in the work
of Fung et al.
Appendix C: Random seed dilution
The input is either given directly or expanded from a
uniformly random seed. Here, we provide a method for
performing the expansion. The expansion is straightfor-
ward since the input is also uniformly random within its
support. We can simply map a uniform seed of length
log
(
N
c1
)
bijectively to the input support, which is the
(
N
c1
)
possibility of choosing the positions of c1 0s from the
string of length N . Then, we obtain the desired input.
Furthermore, note that this construction is deterministic;
thus, input randomness is only needed for the uniformly
random seed of length n.
For the input of our protocol, the ratio of the initial
random seed length to the number of runs N becomes
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negligible as N goes to infinity because the number of
X-basis measurements c1 is a constant, as derived in Ap-
pendix A. More precisely, the min entropy of the input
as well as the length of the uniformly random seed has
an upper bound given by
log
(
N
c1
)
≤ c1 logN. (C1)
Note that since the detector completely controls this ran-
dom seed length, calculating the exact input min entropy
is possible. This is very different from estimating the er-
ror rate in the finite-key analysis section, in which we
can only estimate the range of the error rate with a high
probability of success. Apart from the input specified in
the main text, independent and identically distributed
bit strings are also a possible choice for the input. Fi-
nally, we remark that the reason to include this input
seed length analysis is to make our QRNG composable.
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